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Abstract
This paper defines presence in terms of frames and 
involvement [1]. The value of this analysis of presence is 
demonstrated by applying it to several issues that have been 
raised about presence: residual awareness of non-
mediation, imaginary presence, presence as categorical or 
continuum, and presence breaks. 
The paper goes on to explore the relationship between 
presence and reality. Goffman introduced frames to try to 
answer the question, “Under what circumstances do we 
think things real?” Under frame analysis there are three 
different conditions under which things are considered 
unreal, these are explained and related to the experience of 
presence. Frame analysis is used to show why virtual 
environments are not usually considered to be part of 
reality, although the virtual spaces of phone interaction are 
considered real. The analysis also yields practical 
suggestions for extending presence within virtual 
environments.
Keywords--- presence, frames, virtual environments, 
mobile phones, Goffman.
1. Introduction 
The conventional conceptualization of (tele)presence is 
‘being there’ [2]. This creates a paradox because one cannot 
be in two places at once; to avoid this paradox the virtual 
environment is seen as unreal, however realistic the 
experience [3]. Goffman [1] recognized that different 
‘worlds’ compete for our attention, and that there is a 
relationship between focus of attention and our experience 
of a world as ‘real’. His frame analysis is designed to 
explain the circumstances in which we consider an 
environment real. Its application to virtual environments is 
useful in two ways: firstly, it helps to conceptualize the 
experience of presence in a virtual world, and secondly, it 
provides practical guidelines for increasing the perceived 
reality of virtual environments.  
This paper extends Goffman’s framework theory to 
presence, in two different ways. Firstly, presence is defined 
in terms of two concepts: frames and involvement. This 
analysis of presence is applied to the literature on presence, 
comparing it to other definitions and applying it to several 
contentious issues of presence.  
The second part of this paper uses frame analysis to 
explore the relationship between presence and reality. 
Frame analysis attempts to explain why certain experiences 
are considered real and others are not. Two different 
contexts, virtual reality environments and phone 
interaction, are used to clarify the relationship between 
presence and reality. 
2. Frameworks  
Goffman [1, p. 21] introduces the concept of frames as 
follows: "When an individual in our Western society 
recognizes a particular event, he tends, whatever else he 
does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or 
more frameworks or schemata of interpretation …[which]
is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a 
meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is 
meaningful." In other words, we use frames to interpret our 
experience. Frames answer the question, "What is going on 
here?" [p. 46]. Frames are socially shared and culture 
specific.
Frames organize experiences; they provide 
assumptions about what is going on. Frames are not mental 
objects, but concepts used to decipher what is happening 
around us, "observers actively project their frames of 
reference on the world immediately around them" [1, p. 
39]. Frames provide contexts which enable our 
interpretation of events. The same section or ‘strip’ of 
experience can take different frames. For instance, 
something taken at first as a marriage ceremony may be 
reframed as a rehearsal. What is perceived to be ‘going on’ 
depends on the frame applied. 
This analysis is related to Sheridan's view of a virtual 
environment as a "mental model" that represents a physical 
environment [4,5]. Lackner and Dizio [cited by Schuemie 
et al., 6] suggest that when people have difficulty forming a 
mental model of a space, they report a loss of a sense of 
presence. However, ‘mental model’ suggests a mental 
picture; frames are not additional mental entities but just the 
way that experience is conceptualized. Goffman’s concept 
of frame was derived from the work of Bateson [7]. The 
concept is related to, but is less prescriptive than, Minsky’s 
concept of frame [8] and Schank and Abelson’s concept of 
script [9]. 
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3. Presence 
Presence is the phenomenological experience of being 
in a situation or environment, the sensation of "being there" 
[10, p. 3959]; telepresence is the experience of being 
somewhere other than where one physically is. Presence 
can be analyzed in terms of two concepts used by Goffman 
[1], involvement and frame: presence is engrossing 
involvement in a spatial frame. If presence is ‘being there’, 
involvement relates to ‘being’ and the frame explains what 
is meant by ‘there’, it defines the situation or environment. 
The term ‘involvement’ is not used in the sense of interest 
in the content of an experience, but to describe the 
allocation of attention. For example, the experience of 
presence in a theatrical performance means that one is 
focused on an experience that is framed as being a play. 
When someone is engrossed in a situation or experience 
they feel present; frames define the nature of this presence.  
This does not mean that the frame is predominant, as 
one becomes more engrossed there is less awareness of the 
frame. However, the frame continues to define how the 
experience is interpreted, for instance, seeing a murder on 
stage one does not feel an obligation to call the police, as 
one might if the same experience is seen on the street. One 
may be present in the ordinary world, a daydream, an 
imaginary world, or a mediated experience, etc. The extent 
of involvement in the frame relates to the degree of 
presence experienced.  
3.1. Presence as framed experience 
 Frames explain what is meant by ‘being in’ a mediated 
environment. The mediated environment may be framed as 
a space or a place. Through the use of a physical metaphor 
or frame, the virtual environment becomes a space where 
presence is experienced. The frame both constructs and 
makes sense of the experience. The frame provides the 
context, as Heeter notes, "presence requires a context" [11, 
p. 339]. Schroeder [12, p. 10] uses frames in his analysis of 
virtual environments , "…VEs have a different kind of 
'bandwidth' from real world frames for presenting the self 
to the other. When we enter a VE, a shift in the 'frame' takes 
place..." In a shared virtual environment the frame is shared 
by the participants in the interaction.  
Following Giddens [13] it is useful to distinguish 
places from spaces. Places are physical settings for social 
interaction, they contain social norms; we are located in 
space but we act in place. Places are spaces, but not all 
spaces are places. Electronic mediation enables interaction 
without being in the same physical place; mediated action 
and interaction occur in spaces, but not in places. Virtual 
reality environments may be framed as ‘places’ or ‘spaces’. 
Participants in a phone call frame their interaction as 
occurring in a separate ‘space', not a place. This helps to 
explain the common practice of holding private 
conversations in public places, the participants are ‘on the 
phone’, which is perceived as a private space. In a mediated 
environment, the frame allows one to feel as if one is 
‘there’ and/or to feel as if one is ‘meeting with’ the other 
interactant(s). If the environment is framed as a space rather 
than a place, the paradox of being in two places at one time 
is avoided. 
3.2. Presence as involvement 
Involvement [1, p. 346] is a "psychobiological process 
in which the subject becomes at least partly unaware of the 
direction of his feeling and his cognitive attention." For 
Goffman attention or ‘involvement’ is shared between the 
ordinary world and ‘aways’ such as day dreams, 
hallucinations, self involvements [14, p. 243]. Involvement 
or attention is divided between these different 
‘involvements’, resulting in different degrees of 
involvement in each ‘realm’. Updating this theory, it is 
clear that mediated communication can engage our 
cognitive attention, reducing our presence in the immediate 
environment. Furthermore, attention is focused on the 
experience per se rather than on the mediation of the 
experience: "Speaking to someone on the telephone, is so 
natural, that we almost forget about the intervening 
medium" [15, p. 109].  
"Engrossables" are experiences that are so involving 
that one can be "caught up in or carried away by 
[them]",[1, p. 46]. This paper contends that this creates a 
feeling of presence in the environment; presence is 
engrossing involvement in a spatial frame. This is 
involvement in the framed experience as a whole, not on 
the contents of the frame, or in the frame itself. In fact, 
when one is ‘carried away’ by the experience the frame 
becomes less apparent Being involved in an experience 
means that a considerable share of mental awareness or 
attention is devoted to this experience, this does not imply a 
focus on the direction of attention. 1.
Involvement here is about allocation of attention to the 
experience as a whole, and is neither about involvement in 
some element of the experience nor about involvement in
the framing concept. As Slater [17] points out, one can be 
present even if the content of an experience is uninteresting 
and un-involving. He comments that it is possible to listen 
to a quadraphonic sound system and feel present as in a 
theater before an orchestra, despite feeling uninvolved in 
the music played. Slater argues that what is relevant is the 
‘form’ of the experience, not the content. Frame analysis 
suggests that form and content interact and are not 
independent: the content, or what is understood as ‘going 
on’, depends on the frame applied. Using Slater’s example, 
if the music is not consistent with the frame of being in the 
theater, in front of an orchestra, the frame will break, 
consequently the illusion and the feeling of presence will be 
lost. In addition, if the music is so uninteresting that 
engrossment is lost and attention is reallocated to the 
physical environment, then the illusion, and the feeling of 
presence, will be lost. However, the experience as a whole, 
rather than the just the music, may be sufficiently absorbing 
to retain involvement, so that presence can be experienced 
despite boring music.  
                                                     
1 In the extreme case of flow [16] almost all attention is 
focused on a single frame. 
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In the frame analysis developed here, what is important 
is engrossment in the experience itself and the 
conceptualization of the experience within a spatial frame, 
as a coherent space. The ‘form’ of the experience is given 
by the nature of the frame used to conceptualize the 
experience. The involvement is in an experience framed as 
being in a theater; not in the music per se, nor in the idea of 
being in the theater, but in the experience as a whole.  
The concepts of involvement and frame are related. 
Frames organize involvement; involvement is never total, it 
is restrained by "a measure of cognitive reserve …a wisp of 
doubt concerning framework" [pp. 379-80]. Frames can 
break, because of sudden awareness of incoherence; the 
frame is no longer relevant to the experience, 'flooding out' 
occurs and there is an immediate loss of involvement in the 
frame. Conversely, 'flooding in' occurs when someone 
suddenly becomes involved in a frame, e.g. someone may 
become suddenly engrossed in a television program. The 
transfer of involvement between frames can also be a 
gradual shift of attention, and consequently of presence, 
between different worlds. 
There is some empirical evidence of a relationship 
between the experience of presence and allocation of 
attention. Hoffman et al. [18, p. 1245] subjected research 
participants to moderate pain while exposing them to a 
virtual reality environment and found that “the more 
attention drawn into virtual reality, …the less pain patients 
experience.”. Attention to pain (measured by subjective 
reports of the time spent thinking about pain) was 
significantly reduced when participants were exposed to a 
virtual reality environment. Moreover, magnetic brain 
imaging showed a reduction of pain-related brain activity of 
over 50% during exposure to a virtual reality environment.  
4. Presence as framed involvement 
In this section the analysis of presence in terms of 
framed involvement is related to the literature on presence, 
comparing it to other definitions and applying it to 
contentious areas of presence. The concept of presence is ill 
defined, as Waterworth and Waterworth [19, abs.] 
comment, "Progress in understanding presence is inhibited 
by the fact that we are unable to agree what it is we are 
talking about."
4.1 Presence as non-mediation 
Lombard and Ditton [20, para. 33] define presence as 
"the perceptual illusion of nonmediation". This corresponds 
with deep involvement, one is so “caught up in or carried 
away by” the mediated environment that there is an illusion 
of non-mediation, i.e. loss of awareness of the ‘mediation’ 
frame. 
Although this definition of presence is helpful in 
identifying the engrossment of presence, there are several 
problems with it. Firstly, it only applies to presence in 
mediated environments; this prevents its application to 
physical and imaginary environments. Secondly, the 
illusion of non-mediation either occurs or does not occur; 
this implies that presence is not a matter of degree. The 
authors explain the subjective experience of degrees of 
presence in terms of the number of instants during which 
the illusion of nonmediation occurs. This suggests a 
perpetual mental assessment of which one is unaware, 
which is epistemologically problematic. A further problem 
with this definition is that even if the feeling of presence in 
the mediated environment is very strong, at some level one 
is aware of mediation and misperception. 
This mental equivocacy is reflected in the definition, 
which was refined in the Presence-L Listserv [quoted by 6, 
p. 185]. "Presence (a shortened version of the term 
"telepresence") is a psychological state or subjective 
perception in which even though part or all of an 
individual's current experience is generated by and/or 
filtered through human-made technology, part or all of the 
individual's perception fails to accurately acknowledge the 
role of the technology in the experience. Except in the most 
extreme cases, the individual can indicate correctly that 
s/he is using the technology, but at *some level* and to 
*some degree*, her/his perceptions overlook that 
knowledge and objects, events, entities, and environments 
are perceived as if the technology was not involved in the 
experience." 
There are two reasons for this residual awareness of 
non-mediation. Firstly, involvement is allocated between 
different realms; there is always some residual involvement 
with the physical body and with the physical world. 
Secondly, engrossment is never total, it is restrained by "a
measure of cognitive reserve …a wisp of doubt concerning 
framework and transformations" [1, p. 379-80]. This is 
because we are aware that the application of a frame is 
contingent, there is always the chance that the frame will no 
longer fit the experience. When this happens, involvement 
changes suddenly, there is a frame break, which results in a 
break in presence. 
4.2 Elements of presence 
Lombard and Ditton [20] review the literature and 
distinguish six related concepts of presence: realism; 
transportation; immersion; social richness; social actor 
within medium, medium as social actor. The last three 
relate more to social presence rather than locational 
presence [10], but the first three are key elements of 
presence: realism, is the extent to which the experience is 
realistic and like the real world, transportation is the 
sensation of being in a remote physical environment and 
immersion is the extent to which the senses are engaged in 
the mediated communication. Slater [21, p. 261] adds 
dominance, response and memory. "The extent to which the 
VE becomes the dominant one i.e., that participants will 
tend to respond to events in the VE rather than in the ‘real 
world’…The extent to which participants, after the VE 
experience, remember it as having visited a ‘place’ rather 
than just having seen images generated by a computer."
Draper, Kaber and Usher [22, p. 366] emphasize attention, 
“The more attentional resources that a user devotes to 
stimuli presented by the displays, the greater the 
identification with the computer-mediated environment and 
the stronger the sense of telepresence.” Witmer and Singer 
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[23] also relate presence to attention allocation, dividing 
this into involvement (focus of attention) and immersion or 
engagement with the environment.  
These elements can all be covered using the analysis of 
presence in terms of frame and involvement. If the virtual 
environment is framed as a place, this explains the feeling 
of transportation (movement to a different place), located
memories and response to an environment. The remaining 
elements of presence, that is, immersion, engagement, 
dominant focus, and attention, are all aspects of 
involvement or engrossment. This indicates the robustness 
of the analysis of presence as framed involvement. The 
analysis can also be applied to several areas of interest in 
this field: the experience of presence in imaginary 
environments, presence as a continuum or categorical 
concept, and presence breaks. 
4. 3. Presence in imaginary environments 
Biocca [24, para. 6.1] claims that "at one point in time, 
users can be said to feel as if they are physically present in 
only one of three places …: the physical environment, the 
virtual environment, or the imaginal environment. Presence 
oscillates among these three poles." Heeter [11] and 
Blascovich [25] also refer to presence in imaginary 
environments. However, Slater [17], restricts presence to 
physical and virtual environments, arguing that, while we 
may be engaged or involved with imaginary worlds, this is 
not presence. Waterworth and Waterworth [19, para. 1.4], 
also dispute presence in imaginary environments, arguing 
that presence involves a focus on external stimuli, and that 
imaginary environments do not occur in real time. 
Analysis of presence as involvement and frame extends 
the experience of presence to imaginary worlds; they are 
engrossing, and they deflect attention from the everyday 
world. However, although couched in terms of presence, 
the underlying issue here is the question of reality. Whether 
or not we choose to apply the word 'presence' to imaginary 
worlds, the question highlights two underlying distinctions: 
that between reality and fictitious realms, and that between 
shared and private worlds. This former is discussed in 
section 5, which discusses the relationship between 
presence and reality, and explains how we can feel present 
in realms that we do not consider to be real. 
 4.4. Presence as a Continuum
Draper, Kaber and Usher [22] claim that presence is a 
scale of varying intensity, but Biocca's three poles model 
assumes that presence in the different modes is exclusive. 
Slater and Steed [26, p. 419] attempt to resolve the conflict 
between presence as a continuum, and presence as 
categorically physical or virtual. "We can think of presence 
as a selector amongst environments to which to respond, 
which operates dynamically from moment to moment. If it 
were possible to ‘freeze time’ at a specific instant, then the 
individual would be paying attention and responding to a 
set of stimuli corresponding to one environment, not paying 
attention to all the other stimuli … the set of stimuli of the 
‘present environment’ forms an overall gestalt, providing a 
consistent believable world in itself." This conceptualizes 
presence rather like the editing suite of a live TV feed; the 
'live' camera corresponds to presence; it relates to 
Goffman's 'engrossables' and the way one is 'carried away'. 
However, it is problematic in its suggestion of mental 
processes of which we are unaware. The approach also 
conflicts with the residual awareness of mediation 
experienced in a mediated environment. Ijsselsteijn [27, p. 
253] makes this point, arguing that unlike the familiar 
duck/rabbit gestalt, "Both medium and physical 
environment are distinct entities which may be perceived at 
the same time. … Rather, a break in presence may be 
conceived of as an attentional shift away from the mediated 
environment and towards the physical environment, but 
with the possibility to still feel a sense of presence in the 
mediated environment, albeit to a lesser extent."
The analysis of presence as framed involvement 
portrays presence as a continuum rather than an all-or-none 
concept of presence. However, frame breaks help to explain 
the attraction of the categorical interpretation. When a 
frame breaks, "…the individual's situation can collapse, 
disintegrate, go up in smoke…" [1, p. 302]; involvement 
changes suddenly rather than gradually, creating the 
impression that presence in different environments is 
exclusive.  
4.4. Breaks in presence 
The concept of ‘breaks in presence’ was 
operationalized by Slater and Steed [26]. Breaks in 
presence are transitions between absorption in different 
spheres, e.g. between the virtual and everyday world. Slater 
and Stead note that reporting breaks in presence is not 
possible on transition into the virtual world: “The reporting 
of transitions into the state of absorption is impossible 
without undermining the absorbed state itself." [p. 14]. 
However, transition to the physical world can be reported, 
and they developed a 'virtual presence counter'; this enables 
research respondents to signal when the laboratory, rather 
than the virtual environment, is dominant. The authors 
report a significant negative correlation between presence 
breaks and reported presence in the virtual environment. 
If presence is construed as framed involvement, a 
break in presence may consist simply of a reallocation of 
involvement and a focus on a different frame, or it may 
reflect the dissolution of a frame. Return to the ordinary 
world may involve a sudden transition, when absorption in 
a virtual or imaginary frame is suddenly fractured. Schutz 
describes these as 'shock experiences' as we move from one 
world to another [cited by 1, p. 4]. Goffman [1] writes of 
‘containment’ within a frame, this is disrupted by 
inconsistencies between the frame and the experience. 
Social interaction in a shared frame can reinforce 
containment within the frame, but if one person loses 
involvement this may break the involvement for others. 
When frames break, involvement and presence is 
dissipated. This relates to the claim by Walker and Davide 
[28] that it is breaks in presence that are experienced, rather 
than presence itself; they define presence as the "absence of 
breaks in presence".
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The preceding analysis demonstrates how presence 
defined as engrossing involvement in a spatial frame relates 
to some areas of the presence literature. In the next section 
frame analysis is used to explain the circumstances under 
which we consider things to be real, and to elucidate the 
relationship between presence and reality. 
5. Presence and reality 
Brandt and Metzger [29] distinguish four meanings of 
reality. Reality1 is the objective world that is presumed to 
exist beyond our subjective experience. The subjective, 
phenomenal experience of the world is reality2. Reality3 is 
that which we directly encounter as opposed to that which 
is merely represented in the mind (e.g. thoughts). Reality4
is the extent to which something is experienced as real.
Reality1 and reality2 relate to the positivist and 
phenomenological ideologies. Positivists believe that there 
is an objective knowable reality (reality1), while 
phenomenalists focus on the world of subjective experience 
or reality2. Different philosophies pertain to the 
relationship between reality1 and reality2; social 
constructionists [30] contend that reality is constructed and 
there is no reality1, social constructivists [31] merely 
contend that reality1 is unknowable. Mantovani and Riva 
[3] claim that most scientists take the rationalist position of 
‘ingenuous realism’. This involves a concept of reality as 
both external and knowable; that is, knowledge relates to 
reality1, which is knowable through reality2. Mantovani 
and Riva maintain that this ontological position creates a 
problem for virtual reality, but not for teleoperations 
systems. The latter involves remote control using robotic 
controls, i.e. it involves remote presence in the ordinary 
physical world. However, virtual reality is problematic 
under ingenious realism because it relates to things which 
do not exist, but which create sensory experience; it is 
therefore akin to hallucination. This dilemma, they contend, 
is created by ingenuous realism, which assumes a 
dichotomy between mediated and unmediated experience, 
whereas all experience is mediated. The authors adopt a 
social constructionist view, where reality is defined within a 
cultural framework by negotiation of action and meaning. 
Under this perspective, presence depends not on fidelity but 
“on the capacity of simulation to produce a context in 
which social actors may communicate and cooperate.” [p 
538]. This social constructionist view of reality 
distinguishes shared worlds, such as virtual environments 
and the physical world, from imaginary private worlds, 
such as day dreams and hallucinations, where there is no 
collaborative construction.  
Reality3 is concerned with distinguishing things in 
themselves from their representations e.g. the physical 
world is contrasted with what is imagined or thought. 
Applying Brandt and Metzger’s definition, Heeter [11] 
concludes that reality3 applies to virtual environments 
because they impinge directly on the senses, as opposed to 
simply being represented in the mind. However, the 
definition of reality3 is unsatisfactory; using the authors’ 
example, under this definition one’s liver is not real 
because it is not encountered, whereas dreams and 
hallucinations are real. 
 Frame analysis is also a form of social constuctionism, 
in that frames are culturally relative and confer meaning; 
the theory means that reality2 does not correspond directly 
with reality1. However, this paper, and Goffman’s frame 
analysis, is more concerned with reality4, the extent to 
which we consider our experiences real or genuine. This 
philosophy of language approach explores the use of the 
word ‘real’, rather than the metaphysical question of what 
is reality. This approach has practical application and can 
be applied to the design of virtual environments, 
encouraging participants to consider them real. This is 
discussed in Section 5.5. Frame analysis also introduces a 
further meaning of reality, analogous to reality3, which 
usefully distinguishes between experiences in different 
realms, e.g. between the ordinary world and hallucinations.
5.1. Immersion and reality 
Slater defines ‘immersion’ [17,32] as the extent to 
which a virtual reality environment shuts out the ‘real 
world’, and has rich representational capability. This use of 
immersion contrasts with that of Lombard and Ditton 
discussed in Section 4.2. For Slater immersion is an 
objective quality of the environment corresponding to its 
fidelity to the real-world sensory experience. Immersion is 
not the same as presence, which is a subjective, conscious 
experience that can occur in unrealistic fantasy worlds. 
However, Slater [17] states that there is probably a strong 
empirical correlation between immersion and presence. 
Immersive environments are likely to be more engrossing, 
promoting the experience of presence. More immersive 
environments are more realistic or more ‘real’, but to say 
that something is more, or less real, is actually to deny that 
it is real. Immersion makes an environment more realistic, 
but it does not make it real.  
5.2. Reality and frame analysis 
In his introduction to Frame Analysis [1, p.2] Goffman 
positions this work as an ontological enquiry, in the 
tradition of William James; it is an attempt to answer 
James' question, "Under what circumstances do we think 
things are real?" Frame analysis attempts to identify the 
elements of situations that convince us they are genuine.  
The concept of frame introduced in Section 2 is a 
simplified version of Goffman's frameworks; it ignores the 
difference between primary frames and their 
transformations. To accommodate imaginary and 
illusionary experiences, Goffman uses two frame 
‘transformations’: keyings and fabrications. Fantasy, 
daydreaming and various forms of drama are 'make-believe' 
keyings. On the other hand, hallucinations and dreams are 
fabrications because they involve (self) deception. 
Transformations are cues that something is not real. 
Transformations can relate to whole realms, e.g. an 
imaginary world, or to experience within the ordinary 
physical world, which is not real in the sense that it is not 
what it appears to be, e.g. a play fight. Recognition of a 
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transformed frame is one way of deciding that something is 
not real. Goffman did not specifically consider mediated 
environments as a category; most virtual reality 
environments have the special status Goffman gives to 
theatrical performances, where we are willingly 
"transformed into collaborators in unreality", these are 
"voluntarily supported benign fabrication(s)" [p. 136].  
For Goffman, what makes something real relates to 
both involvement and frame. He notes that it is their 
potential for inducing engrossment that makes other worlds 
seem ‘real’ [1, p. 347]. Worlds where we become engrossed 
or carried away seem real; it is this same involvement 
which induces a sense of presence in that world. 
Engrossment or involvement is therefore one aspect that 
makes things seem real. The reality of an experience also 
depends on how it is framed. 
There are two ways in which an experience may be 
deemed unreal in virtue of the frame applied. Firstly, the 
type of frame is relevant, whether something is real or 
unreal depends on the frame used, under one frame it may 
be real and under another not real; without a frame it is 
meaningless. If the frame is a keying or fabrication the 
experience framed is deemed unreal. For example, a 
theatrical play is not real because drama is keyed as make 
believe. In other words, application of a transformed frame 
automatically implies that the experience is not considered 
real. Secondly, an experience may be unreal because the 
frame applied does not fit the experience. So an event 
framed as murder is shown to be unreal when the victim 
gets up. When we perceive that the frame does not ‘contain’ 
the experience, the frame ‘breaks’, we realize that the 
experience is not real. “Experience … finds no form and is 
therefore no experience. Reality anomically flutters." [1, p. 
302]. If the scene is framed as street theater, the recovery of 
the victim does not disrupt the frame; both involvement and 
presence are sustained. However, the event would still not 
be real because the frame, ‘street theater’ is a ‘make 
believe’ frame; this makes the framed experience unreal.  
Imaginary worlds are not part of the ordinary world; 
framed as imaginary they are unreal because of the 
transformed frame, framed as part of the physical world 
they are not real because the experience does not match the 
frame. Frames and transformations thus help to distinguish 
what we can call real. 
The concepts of presence and appearance of reality are 
related in that both are induced by engrossment, and 
disrupted by frame breaks. However, presence can occur in 
worlds recognized as unreal, for instance, in the theater or 
in a day dream. 
5.3. Reality and mediated communication 
Zhao [4] distinguishes remote from virtual presence, he 
claims the former extends sensory information, creating an 
experience of 'being' there or 'being' in a remote location; 
the latter simulates sensory information, creating an 
experience of being 'there' or being in a virtual space. In the 
first case, it is the existence or 'being' that is not literal, in 
the second it is the place that is not 'real'. 
In phone calls there is both remote presence and virtual 
presence. Phone conversation occurs simultaneously in two 
physical locations, remote presence of the other person is 
experienced at each location. In addition, there is the shared 
virtual space, the participants meet ‘on the phone’. In phone 
calls sound is produced sequentially and is transient, so that 
interpretation requires continuous attention, furthermore, 
silence is not socially acceptable. Consequently, phone calls 
require a large allocation of attention. A phone call is a 
frame in which we become engrossed, but phone calls are 
not framed as places. This may be because they are not 
visual and have few spatial cues. A phone call is 
conceptualized as a space where people meet, the meeting 
is real but there is no meeting place. This avoids disruption 
of the frame; it is perfectly possible to feel present in the 
phone call and in a physical location at the same time. 
Videophones show the physical location of each 
participant; there are actually three spaces, that of each 
participant and the phone space. However, there is no 
inherent inconsistency because each participant is only 
deemed to be in one place at a time. 
Virtual reality environments are often framed as places. 
They may include visual sensory experience and 
incorporate three dimensional locational cues, with separate 
areas and movement between different locations. These 
increase immersion (representational fidelity) and 
presumably presence. However, this encourages use of a 
‘place’ frame which creates problems. The physical 
location of a person is given by that of his physical body, 
and it is impossible to be in two places at the same time. 
The frame ‘place’ therefore includes an inherent 
incoherence, which reduces containment in the frame. 
There are various ‘self-involvements’ such as stomach 
rumblings which automatically refocus attention on the 
body creating awareness of conflicting locations.  
5.4. Staying in the frame 
Containment in the frame depends on coherence 
between the experience and the frame, but this coherence, 
in turn, depends on the frame employed. For example, if a 
make believe frame is applied, for example, ‘theater’, then 
coherence between frame and experience is easier to 
achieve. This is because the frame includes a convention of 
‘suspension of disbelief’ and imposes fewer constraints on 
the types of experience that are consistent with the frame. 
On the other hand, if a ‘real world’ frame is applied this 
requires ‘real world’ fidelity to prevent dissolution of the 
frame. The frame applied is not completely dependent on 
the participant, because it is cued by the experience itself. 
For instance, in the theater the stage and curtains signal the 
relevance of the theater frame. 
Frame theory can be applied to the design of virtual 
environments and used to facilitate containment in the 
frame, thus reducing frame breaks and prolonging presence 
in the environment. There are a number of factors that 
encourage containment within the frame. These include 
consistency between frame and experience, social 
interaction with others who appear to apply the same frame, 
emotional involvement in the framed experience, and 
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consistency with other frames. Goffman also describes how 
the Shakespearian device of a play within a play has the 
effect of increasing involvement and containment in the 
theater frame. The actors and audience share the play-
within-a-play frame; this makes the actors seem more real 
and encourages engrossment. 
Locational cues that promote the use of a place frame 
create potential inconsistency between the physical location 
of the participant and his apparent location in the virtual 
world. This conflict may be exacerbated by a virtual reality 
helmet; ideally participants should be physically 
comfortable to minimize self-involvements, which draw 
attention to the physical world.  
The phone space in a phone call illustrates how a 
virtual space allows participants to be comfortable in two 
spaces at one time. Alternatively, the virtual element may 
be seamlessly integrated within the physical environment, 
e.g. in augmented reality. On the other hand, locational cues 
encourage action within the virtual environment, this may 
promote presence, especially if the action is cooperative, in 
that it reinforces the frame. 
Involvement and containment in a theater frame is 
supported by conventions which clearly signal the ‘make 
believe’ frame, for instance the use of a narrator, and the 
conventions of dramatic discourse, etc. In addition, the 
stage and curtains separate the performance place from the 
audience, preventing conflict between the two spaces. 
Adopting a frame that signals unreality may reduce conflict 
and increase presence. Virtual environments can develop 
and adopt conventions which signal virtuality, for example, 
the use of avatars. While this also signals that the 
environment is unreal or fabricated, it may nevertheless 
promote involvement and containment in the frame, and 
therefore prolong presence. Perversely, in this way, a lack 
of fidelity may improve presence by signaling the virtual 
frame, presence is extended at the expense of reality. 
6. Conclusions
Frame analysis helps to clarify the concept of presence 
and its relationship to reality. Experience, contents and 
frame interact in the construction of the perceived 
experience. Presence in the virtual environment occurs 
when the experience is engrossing but is lost when there is 
inconsistency between the frame applied and the contents. 
Paradoxically this can mean that if the contents are too
realistic they may conflict with the virtual frame. 
Locational cues which suggest that the user is physically in 
the environment are particularly liable to create conflict 
with awareness of actual physical location. For some 
applications of virtual environments unreality may be a 
benefit, for example, in the treatment of phobias the 
patient’s awareness of the virtual frame enables a 
controlled level of engagement with the object of his 
phobia. 
 Presence is engrossing involvement in a spatial frame 
or transformed frame. Frames explain what is meant by 
being in a mediated environment. They resolve the paradox 
of how one can experience different environments or 
realms at the same time, without being in two places at one 
time. Involvement allocation explains the degree of 
presence experienced. The flexibility of framework theory 
accommodates imaginary, virtual and physical worlds and 
the many nuances of these basic modes. The theory can also 
be used to elucidate the concept of reality, and its 
relationship to presence. 
There are three different grounds for considering an 
experience real: engrossment, containment within a frame, 
and use of an untransformed frame. The first two also 
promote presence, but the unreality of a transformed frame 
does not prevent the experience of presence, and may 
extend containment. 
In terms of mediated communication, a phone call is 
clearly part of reality; although the phone environment 
where the interactants meet is a virtual space, it is 
considered real. On the other hand, while playing a virtual 
reality game is a real activity, the game environment, 
however engaging, is not. This is because it is framed as a 
place, when it is clearly not physical; the place frame 
conflicts with residual awareness of their actual physical 
location undermining containment in the frame. 
What makes something seem real is engrossment, the 
relationship between the frame and the content of the 
experience, and the type of frame applied. Frame analysis 
identifies as unreal both experiences which are misframed 
and those where although the correct frame is applied, the 
type of frame indicates that, in some sense, they are not 
real. Goffman’s use of ‘real’ is rather extreme, because 
although daydreams and virtual environments are not part 
of the ordinary everyday world, they are real experiences. 
Similarly, if I watch street theater this is a real experience, 
but it consists of two different frames, ‘being in the street’ 
and ‘street drama’; the keyed frame of the latter indicates 
that what is seen cannot be taken at face value. In both 
these situations there is an element of unreality, things are 
not quite what they seem, and in this way they are ‘unreal’; 
paradoxically this makes reality consistent with a degree of 
unreality.  
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